The Middle East deadlock

Turkey is facing a new crisis in the Middle East: The crisis between Qatar and four Arab states that want to oppress it. The four Arab states are Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), but they have supporters.

In this crisis, the U.S., in order not to undermine its patronage on both sides, insists to "solve it with dialogue," by selling arms to both sides. Russia is avoiding being on a definite side.  

Turkey, on the other hand, is an active side in the crisis. Was it really necessary to take a side in such a crisis?

One of the 13 conditions the four Arab states imposed on Qatar is the closure of the Turkish military base in Qatar. Look at the hostility we have been subjected to while trying to "increase the number of our friends." Moreover, we are freshly exposed to new information that the United Arab Emirates supported the July 15, 2016, coup treachery with $1 billion.

For the military coup in Egypt, Saudi Arabia had given $5 billion; in place of the $5 billion loan the Muslim Brotherhood asked from the IMF.

U.A.E. Foreign Minister Anwar Gargash spoke to the Guardian, in which he threatened Turkey with economic interests. "We hope that Turkey prioritizes the interest of the Turkish state and not partisan ideology," he said.  

This is a sign that the crisis in the region might escalate to "Turkey's interests."

Ankara's reaction was sending combatant troops to the military base in Qatar. According to columnist Abdulkadir Selvi, with this act, Ankara activated its "hard power" because it saw that the next extension of the Qatar blockade was Turkey.

The question we need to ask is this: In a dispute between the Arabs, was it necessary for us to take such a side, risking...