Ball in whose court on coup bid intelligence?

The July 2016 coup attempt of Fethullah Gülen's followers took decades of systematic planning, which involved the infiltration of the Turkish Armed Forces from bottom to top. By the time of the coup attempt, Gülen's followers occupied almost half of the general and admiral positions. 

How could it go unnoticed that this organized crime network had created its own domain within the military? Thousands of people were involved, covering every organ of the army. How come it was not picked up by the state intelligence radars? 

The parliamentary inquiry commission on the coup attempt asked these questions to representatives of several institutions. But it looks like everyone was trying to simply throw the ball into someone else's court.

Let us look at the military wing of the debate. We see the justification of "the inability to monitor staff outside the barracks" as a common theme. Among other reasons, "It was impossible to monitor military personnel after office hours outside the barracks, headquarters and institutions," said former Chief of General Staff Gen. Necdet Özel, who led the military from 2011 to 2015, when asked why the Gülenist infiltration of the armed forces went unnoticed.

Özel's successor, Gen. Işık Koşaner, said more in the commission's Oct. 26, 2016 session. "The military does not have a duty or authorization to monitor or collect intelligence outside the borders of military quarters. It is illegal. Our intelligence activities are limited to inside the military quarters or exercise zones. As a result, all we had was information sent from the National Intelligence Organization [MİT] and the police force, so we had to count on them. We examined the information provided by them and the personnel were discharged if it...